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Thierry Chauveau**
ABSTRACT: If an investor does care for utilities and not for monetary outcomes
stochastic dominances should be expressed in terms of utility units ("utils"). If so,
any "rational" investor may be characterized by an elementary utility function called
canonical utility functionwhich is such that the partial weak order induced by sto-
chastic dominance over utils is as "close" to the weak order of preferences as possible.
As a consequence, the random utilities of the available prospects do not violate the
second-order stochastic dominance property. Substituting utils for monetary units
leads to substitute "subjective" risk for "objective" risk à la Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1970). A weakened independence axiom may then be set over comparable prospects,
i.e. those which exhibit the same canonical expected utility. This leads to a fully
choice-based theory of disappointment. The functional is lottery-dependent (Becker
and Sarin 1987). When constant marginal utility is assumed, it is but the opposite to
a convex measure of risk (Föllmer and Schied 2002). It may be viewed as a theoretical
justication for choosing this measure of risk.
JEL classication: D81. Key-words: disappointment, risk-aversion, subjective risk, risk
premium, expected utility.
RESUME : Si un agent économique rationnel est moins sensible au niveau de son
revenu quà lutilité de celui-ci, e¤ectuer des tests de dominance stochastique na de
sens que si ces tests portent sur les utilités de revenus aléatoires. On peut laors montrer
que cet agent est caractérisé par une fonction dutilité élémentaire telle que les utilités
des revenus aléatoires ne violent jamais la dominance stochastique de second ordre.
Le préodre induit par la dominance stochastique est alors aussi proche que possible du
préordre des préférences et lon peut généraliser la notion de risque à la Rothschild et
Stiglitz en raisonnant en terme de risque "subjectif" où les valeurs sont exprimées en
utilités. On peut enn poser un axiome dindépendance a¤aibli qui nest valide que
pour les revenus aléatoires "comparables" cest-à-dire ceux qui ont la même espérance
dutilité. Cette nouvelle axiomatisation du comportement dun individu en univers
incertain aboutit à une théorie de la déception où la fonctionnelle représentant les
préférences est "loterie-dépendante" (Becker and Sarin 1987). Si lutilité marginale de
linvestisseur est constante, la nouvelle fonctionnelle nest que lopposé dune mesure
de risque convexe (Föllmer and Shied 2002) et elle peut constituer la justication de
celle-ci.
JEL classication: D81. Mots-clés : déception, aversion pour le risque, risque subjectif,
prime de risque, utilité espérée.
* This paper was rst presented at the Paris1 Finance Seminar on the 20th of
June 2012.
** Université Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne. e-mail: chauveau@univ-paris1.fr
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1 Introduction
According to many theories of decision making under risk, preferences may be
represented by a functional which depends on the utility of a random outcome.
This means that an investor is sensitive but to the utility of his wealth. Equiv-
alently, one can say that, to take a nancial decision, he only needs to know the
values of the utilities of the outcomes he may get. A well-known example is the
case when expected utility theory (henceforth EU theory) is valid: the value
of a random prospect is a probability weighted average of the utilities of the
possible outcomes. When marginal utility is variable, an investor is risk-averse
(prone) if his elementary utility function is concave (convex). In the particular
case of constant marginal utility, he is risk-neutral. Finally, in any case, the
investor takes into account but an average of the results of a gamble to which
he is sensitive. In other words, whatever his attitude towards risk (risk-aversion,
risk-proneness or neutrality), he behaves in the same way. This looks as a para-
dox. A second paradox is that checking for the rationality of the behaviour of
an investor is often undertaken through implementing a second-order stochastic
dominance test where monetary values are taken into account. This is clearly
inconsistent if the investor cares for utilities rather than for monetary values.
By contrast, if an investor behaves according to a theory such as that of
Loomes and Sugden (henceforth L&S) (1986), he is considered as risk-neutral as
long as he averages utilities. He is risk-averse/prone if and only if (henceforth i¤)
his welfare includes expected elation/disappointment in addition to the expected
utility of his wealth. Elation/disappointment depends on the gap between the
utility of the actual outcome and the expected utility of the prospect. Moreover,
it becomes easy to dene stochastic dominance with respect to "utils" i.e. units
of welfareinstead of monetary units using the frame of L&S (1986). Risk may
then be dened in accordance with the new denition of second-order stochastic
dominance.
Unfortunately, the theory of L&S (1986) lacks an axiomatic basis, and so
do most of the other disappointment models developed since that time. As a
consequence, it seems of interest to develop a fully choice-based theory of dis-
appointment which will allow for a satisfactory distinction between risk-averse,
risk-neutral and risk-prone investors.
The main idea of this paper is that the utility function of an investor may be
inferred from a comparison between the weak order which represents his pref-
erences and the partial preorder induced by second-order stochatic dominance
over utils. The "closer" to the former is the latter, the more likely the utility
function is to represent preferences. Of course, to make sense, the previous
statement requires that the closeness between the two weak orders will have
rst been dened which will be done in Section 2.
Next, a partition of the set of the random prospects will be made. Each
subset then includes prospects exhibiting the same expected utility. The inde-
pendence axiom will be set over each subset of prospects and a standard rep-
resentation theorem will be used to dene, for any subset, a lottery-dependent
functional. Finally, preferences will be represented by a functional which encom-
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passes, as particular cases, that of EU theory and that of Loomes and Sugden.
Unlike most of its predecessors, this lottery-dependent model preserves a fully
choice-based approach and is testable. Moreover, the corresponding decision
theory is endowed with two interesting properties: (i) when constant marginal
utility is assumed, the certainty equivalent of a prospect is but the opposite to
a convex measure of risk à la Föllmer and Schied (2002) and (ii) it provides
a mathematical expression of the value of a risk premium as a function of risk
aversion and of a quantity of risk. However, to get the last property, one must
leave aside the usual denition of risk which is a scalar and split any risk
premium into elementary risk premia, each of which may be identied to the
product of a quantity of risk by risk aversion.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: rst, stochastic dominance
is revisited and the denitions of subjective risk and of rational investors are
claried. Next, the axiomatization of a general theory of disappointment is
developed. Section 4 concludes.
2 Revisiting stochastic dominance
2.1 Preliminary denitions
From now on, we consider a set of random prospects, labelled W, whose
outcomes are monetary and belong to a bounded interval of R, say [a; b]. An
element of W will be labelled ew and its cumulative distribution function F ew (:).
If a random prospect ew has a discrete support {w1; w2; :::; wK}, it will also be
denominated [w1; w2; :::; wK ; p1; p2; :::; pK ] where pk = Pr ( ew = wk). A proba-
bility mixture of ew
1
and ew
2
, will be denoted  ew1  (1 ) ew2, where  belongs
to [0; 1]. The degenerate lottery whose outcome is w with certainty is  (w).
Preferences over prospects will be denoted -, with  (strict preference) and 
(indi¤erence). The certainty equivalent of the prospect ew 2W is labelled c ( ew),
i.e. ew (c ( ew)). A normalized elementary utility function (henceforth n.e.u.
function) is a continuously derivable and strictly increasing function mapping
[a; b] on to [0; 1]. The set of n.e.u. functions will be denoted U.
Simultaneously, partial weak orders may be dened, independently of pref-
erences: they include rst and second-order stochastic dominance (henceforth
FSD and SSD). FSD (SSD) will be denoted -1,(-2) with 1 (2) for strict
dominance. A partial weak order induced by FSD (SSD) is consistent with the
total weak order of preferences if we have the following implication: ew
1
-1 ew2 )ew
1
 ew
2
( ew
1
-2 ew2 ) ew1  ew2). It is often argued that a "good" theory of
decision making under risk must be endowed with two properties: (Property a)
For any investor, the weak order induced by rst-order stochastic dominance is
consistent with the weak order of preferences. (Property b) For any risk-averse
investor, the weak order of preferences is consistent with the weak order induced
by second-order stochastic dominance. As already said, this way of reasoning
is somewhat paradoxical since, on the one hand, an investor is assumed to be
sensitive to the utility of an outcome but, on the other hand, the consistency
3
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of his behaviour is checked with a test of stochastic dominance over monetary
outcomes. Hence it seems preferable to substitute utils for monetary values i.e.
to dene subjective stochastic dominances as indicated below:
Denition 1 (First-order and second-order subjective stochastic
dominance (henceforth FSSD and SSSD)). Let ew1 and ew2 be two ar-
bitrary random prospects. Let u (:) be a n.e.u. function and let e!i = u ( ewi)
for i = 1; 2. It is equivalent to state that ew1 dominates ew2 by FSSD (SSSD)
or that e!1 dominates e!2 by FSD (SSD), i.e. ew1-u1 ew2 , e!1-1e!2 ( ew2-u2 ew1 ,e!2-2e!1), where FSSD (SSSD) is denoted -u1 (-u2).
Of course, looking at levels of outcomes may be equivalent to looking at
utilities. This happens to be the case when rst-order dominance is taken into
account. Indeed, FSD is a property which is conservative through the change
of random variable: e! = u ( ew).1 By contrast, this result is no longer valid,
when second-order stochastic dominance is considered. Actually, the following
characterization of SSSD holds:
Proposition 1 (characterization of SSSD). Let ew1 and ew2 be two ar-
bitrary random prospects, let u (:) be a n.e.u. function and let e!i = u ( ewi) for
i = 1; 2. It is equivalent to state: (a) ew1 dominates ew2 by SSSD (i.e. ew2 -u2 ew1)
or (b)
R z
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx  0 for any z 2 [a; b]
Proof. It is given in the Appendix..
As a consequence, it is convenient to set the following denition
Denition 2. A n.e.u. function u (:) is consistent with the weak order of
preferences  if the partial weak order induced by SSSD never contradicts the
total weak order induced by preferences, i. e. if, for any pair of prospects
( ew1; ew2) such that ew2 -u2 ew1, then ew2 - ew1.
By contrast, if there exists at least one pair of prospects ( ew1; ew2) such that
either ew2 -u2 ew1 and ew2  ew1, or such that ew2 u2 ew1 and ew2 % ew1, then,
the n.e.u. function u (:) is not consistent with the weak order of preferences 
. If an investor cares for utilities, his n.e.u. function will be consistent with his
weak order of preferences and it becomes of interest to consider a "subjective"
notion of risk whose denition will be consistent with SSSD i.e. with SSD over
utilities. Actually, the denition given by Rothchild and Stiglitz (henceforth
R&S) (1970) for "objective" risks may be transposed in the following way:
Denition 3 (subjective risk). Let u (:) be a n.e.u. function. The random
prospect ew1 is subjectively less risky than the random prospect ew2 if the two
following conditions are met:
(a) ew1 dominates ew2 by SSSD (i.e. ew2 -u2 ew1) and
(b)
R b
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx = 0.
Note that SSSD has been substituted for SSD in condition (a) whereas the
integral condition (b) coincides with that of R&S (1970) if marginal utility is
constant. As a consequence, if ew1 is subjectively less risky than ew2, then its
expected utility is equal to that of ew2. Indeed, we have the following equality:R b
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx =   (E [u ( ew1)]  E [u ( ew2)]) (1)
1The proof of this statement is trivial.
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We now give another example: consider the preorder of preferences which is
represented by the following functional:
U ( ew) def= R b
a
(u (x) + E(u (x)  E [u ( ew)])) dF ew (x) (2).
where the following conditions are met: (a) E (0) = 0, (b) 0 < E 0 (x) < 1, (c)
E 00 (x) < 0 and (d) sup E 0(z)  1.2 The functional (2) has been introduced
by L&S (1986) and it will be called, from now on, a LS-functional. As shown
in the next proposition, the elementary utility function of a LS-functional is
consistent.
Proposition 2. Let u (:) be the n.e.u. function of a model where preferences
are represented by a LS-functional: then u (:) is consistent with the weak order
of preferences represented by the functional.
Proof. It is given in the Appendix.
2.2 Properties of consistent utility functions
Recall that the weak order induced by FSSD (SSSD) is partial. Hence the
following denition will make sense.
Denition 4 (comparable prospects). Two prospects are comparable
with respect to u (:) or, in short, comparable, i¤ either ew1 dominates ew2
by SSSD or if ew2 dominates ew1 by SSSD. The subset of prospects which are
comparable with respect to u (:) will be denominated Wu2 .
Let Wu+2 (W
u 
2 ) consist in the subset of pairs of prospects ( ew1 ; ew2) over
which the two weak orders, -u2 and , coincide (disagree). Clearly, the two
subsets constitute a partition ofWu2 and the n.e.u. function u (:) is all the more
a good candidate for representing the preferences of an investor that Wu+2 is
larger andWu 2 more tiny.
It is easy to increase the size ofWu+2 through making u (:) more and more
concave. Unfortunately, such a process leads to an increase of the size of the
subset of comparable prospects and, consequently, the size of Wu 2 may also
increase...This dilemma is detailed in the below proposition and corollaries.
Proposition 3. Let u (:) and v (:) be two n.e.u. functions such that u (:) is
more concave than v (:). Then, we have the following implication:ew
1
-v2 ew2 ) ew1 -u2 ew2
and the following inclusions:
Wv+2 Wu+2 ;Wv 2 Wu 2
Proof. It is given in the Appendix.
Actually, we want to describe the behaviour of a rational investor, i.e. we
want to rule out violations of SSSD. In other words, we are looking for a n.e.u.
function which will be consistent. Actually, many n.e.u. functions are consis-
tent. Hence, we must choose among them the "best" one. To do this, one may
dene the closeness of two weak orders over W as follows: the weak order -u2 is
closer to the weak order  than the weak order -v2 i¤ either
2 The reasons for these conditions are: (a) no elation/disappointment is experimented if
the actual outcome coincides with its expected value; (b and c) elation/disappointment is an
increasing and concave function of the di¤erence between the utility of the actual outcome
and that of its expected value; (d) disappointment must not vary too quickly.
5
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Wu 2 Wv 2 or
Wu 2 =W
v 
2 andW
v+
2 Wu+2 .
In the case when two consistent n.e.u. functions, u (:) and v (:), are consid-
ered, we have Wu 2 = W
v 
2 = ? and u (:) is "better" than v (:) i.e. -u2 is
closer to  than -v2i¤Wv+2  Wu+2 . Of course, one cannot rule out, on a
priori grounds, that there may exist two consistent n.e.u. functions u (:) and
v (:) such that neitherWu+2 Wv+2 norWv+2 Wu+2 .
However, if we focus on functions which are either convex or concave, it
can be shown that there exists a n.e.u. function, u(:), which is such that the
weak order -u2 is, among the weak orders induced by SSSD, the closest to the
weak order of preferences. Indeed, let UC  U denominate the subset of n.e.u.
functions which are either concave or convex and UC (UC) the subset of elements
of UC which are consistent (inconsistent). As shown in the next proposition,
there exists a consistent n.e.u. function which is the "best" among the elements
of UC.
Proposition 4.
(a) If no violation of SSD occurs, then, the lower envelope of the functions
belonging to UC is consistent and it is the most concave among the consistent
and concave n.e.u. functions.
(b) If violations of SSD occur, then, the higher envelope of the functions
belonging to UC is consistent and it is the less convex among the consistent and
convex n.e.u. functions.
(c) In both cases, the envelope induces a weak order -u2 which is the closest
to the weak order of preferences among the partial orders induced by concave
or convex n.e.u. functions.
Proof. It is given in the Appendix.
Indeed, two cases may occur: either some violations of SSD exist or not. In
the latter case, it can be shown that UC contains convex and concave consistent
n.e.u. functions whereas, in the former one, it contains only convex functions.
As a consequence, we may now set the following denition:
Denition 5 (rationalizing functions). If violations of SSD occur (do not
occur), the higher (lower) envelope of the consistent n. e .u. functions which
are convex (concave), is called a rationalizing function, or, equivalently, one can
say that it rationalizes the weak order of preferences.
Examples where a standard utility function rationalizes the preferences of an
investor have been already provided. This is a strong incentive for developping
a theory of decision making under risk in which each investor will be endowed
with a rationalizing utility function.
3 A simple theory of decision making under risk
A fully choice-based theory of decision making under risk is now presented.
To allevy the exposition, we focus on the case when no violations of SSD occur.
As a consequence, if preferences are rationalized by a n.e.u. function, then the
function is concave.
6
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3.1 The axiomatics
The rst step consists in assuming that preferences obey the two rst axioms
of EU theory.
Axiom 1 (total ordering of ). The binary relation  is a complete
weak order.
Axiom 2 (continuity of ). For any prospect ew 2 W the sets {ev 2 W pev ew} and {ev 2W p ewev} are closed in the topology of weak convergence.
Axioms 1 and 2 imply the Archimedean property according to which, ifew;;  ew  ew;, then there exists  2 [0; 1] such that  ew; (1  ) ew;;  ew. They
also imply that there exists a continuous utility functional, U(:), mappingW on
to an interval of R which represents the investors preferences. It is dened up
to a strictly continuous and increasing transformation. From now on, the set
which includes the functionals such as U(:) will be denominated V.
To get stronger results, one (or more) additional axiom(s) must be set. In
EU theory, a third axiom, namely the independence axiom is set. It is valid
over the whole set W. However, to account for anomalies, one must weaken
the axiom. This will now be done through setting it only for prospects which
are comparable. If there exists a n.e.u. function u (:) which rationalizes the
preferences of the investor, then comparable prospects will exhibit the same
expected utility. Hence, we set the following two axioms:
Axiom 3 (rationality). Any investor is rational, i.e. investorspreferences
are rationalized by a n.e.u. function u(:), which will be called, from now on, the
canonical utility function.
Axiom 4 (weak independence axiom). The independence property is
met over each subset of comparable prospects.
A well-known consequence of Axiom 4 is the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Under Axioms 1 to 4, the weak order of preferences  may
be represented over W by the lottery-dependent functional:
U ( ew) def= R ba (x)dFew(x);
where  = E [u ( ew)] and where  (:) is a continuous and increasing function
mapping [a; b] on to [(a);(b)] which is dened up to an a¢ ne and positive
transformation.
Proof. See, for instance, Fishburn (1970).
From now on, we set the following normalization conditions:
(u
 1 ()) =  and  (b) + (1  ) (a) = u (3),
where u
def
= u(c) and c
def
= c( ewa;b ).
As a consequence, (:) is, from now on, unambiguously dened. Note
that U( ewa;b ) = u and that U    u 1() = . Clearly, any random
prospect ew 2 W is such that 0  U( ew)  1 or, equivalently such thatewa;b  ew    u 1() (4).
We now turn to some other important consequences of the above set of
axioms.
For any ew 2W, there exists a unique real number  ew 2 [0; 1] such that ew 
L( ew), or, equivalently, such that c( ew) = c ew . Its existence is a consequence
7
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of Axiom 2. Moreover,  ew is well unique since (a) L (0) strictly dominates
L (") by SSD i¤ 0 > " and that (b), by assumption, SSD is never violated.
Finally, the lottery-dependent functional U (:) expresses as:
U ( ew) =  ew + (1   ew)u,
and we may substitute LE[u( ew)]( ew) for ew when ranking prospects.
Now, from (4) we get that the certainty equivalent of a random prospectew 2 W or, equivalently, that of L( ew), lies between c and u 1(). As
a consequence, its utility u(c( ew)) which is also u(c(L( ew))) is a convex
combination of u and . Hence we have:
u (c( ew)) = + (1  )u
Clearly the real number  is a continuous and strictly increasing function
of  ew mapping [0; 1] on to itself. It will be denominated, from now on, ( ew).
Let:
U ( ew) def= ( ew) + (1  ( ew))u = (   u)( ew) + u
The above functional clearly represents preferences over the whole set W
and its restriction over the subset of the degenerate lotteries coincides with
the canonical utility function. Two di¤erent functionals cannot coincide on
the subset of degenerate lotteries since they are dened up to a continuous
and strictly increasing transformation. Hence, U (:) is the unique preference
representing functional satisfying the following condition: U ((z)) = u(z) for
z 2 [a; b]. The above discussion may be summed up in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Under Axioms 1 to 4, there exists a unique family of
functions f(:)g2[0;1] such that
(i) each element of the family is a continuous and strictly increasing function
mapping [0; 1] on to itself
(ii) preferences of a rational investor over W may be represented by the
lottery-dependent functional:
U ( ew) = (E [u( ew)] uE[u( ew)])E[u( ew)]
 R b
a
E[u( ew)](x)dF ew(x)  uE[u( ew)]
E [u( ew)]  uE[u( ew)])
!
+uE[u( ew)] (5)
where ew 2W, u(:) is the canonical utility function, uE[u( ew)] def= u(c( ewa;bE[u( ew)]),
and E[u( ew)](:) is dened according to Proposition 5 and to (3).
(iii) the restriction of U ( ew) over the subset of degenerate lotteries coincides
with the canonical utility function or, equivalently, U ( (z)) = u(z), for any
z 2 [a; b].
Proof. See the above discussion.
The lottery-dependent functional in (5), is far too general to be implemented.
Hence we can try to particularize it.
3.2 Regular preferences
A case of interest is when  is the identity function  () = . If this
property is shared by all the  (:)s, we shall say that preferences are regular.
Clearly, the condition  () =  is equivalent to the following one:
8
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ewa;b  L+(1 )u ().
Indeed, we then have:
U
 L+(1 )u () = (   u)+(1 )u () + u = (   u) + u =
U( ewa;b ).
Hence, preferences are regular if, given two arbitrary real numbers  2 [0; 1]
and  2 [0; 1], the random prospect ewa;b is indi¤erent to L+(1 )u (). In
other words, the utility of the certainty equivalent of any random prospectew 2W is a convex combination of  and u whose weights coincide with those
of the compound lottery L( ew) which is indi¤erent to ew. Hence, we get the
following corollaries:
Corollary 1. Under Axioms 1 to 4, preferences are regular if and only if,
for any couple of real numbers (; ) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1], the random prospect ewa;b
is indi¤erent to L+(1 )u(c( ewa;b )) ().
Proof. See the above discussion.
Corollary 2. Under Axioms 1 to 4, regular preferences  may be repre-
sented over W by the lottery-dependent functional:
U ( ew) def= R b
a
E[u( ew)](x)dF ew(x); (6)
where E[u( ew)] (:) is dened according to Proposition 5 and the normalization
conditions (3).
Proof. It is a direct consequence of the denition of regular preferences and
of Proposition 6.
Finally, note that preferences are regular if they are represented by a LS-
functional and/or when marginal utility is constant.
3.3 Properties of disappointment models with regular pref-
erences
Many examples of models where preferences satisfy Axioms 1 to 4 can be given.
We here focus on models which are endowed with regular preferences. Before
we review their properties we consider z(x) as a function of the two variables,
namely z and x, and, consequently, we set f (z; x)
def
= z(x).
3.3.1 Constant marginal utility
We rst examine the case when marginal utility is constant (u (x) = x), i.e.
when the functional reads:
U( ew) = c ( ew) = R b
a
f(E[ ~w]; x)dF ~w(x) (7).
From the properties of z(x) we get that f (z; x) is is strictly increasing and
concave with respect to x and meets the following condition: f (0; 0) = 0. It is
of interest to particularize f (z; x) to get a more operational specication. This
can be done through assessing additional conditions to preferences.
First, consider the risk premium ( ~w)
def
= E[ ~w]   c ( ew) of an arbitrary
prospect ew 2 W. One may assume that risk premia are translation-invariant,
i.e., ( ~w+x) = ( ~w) or, equivalently, c ( ew + y) = c ( ew)+y. Under reasonable
9
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mathematical assumptions, one may show that a necessary and su¢ cient con-
dition for (:) to exhibit the invariance property is that @f=@x + @f=@z = 1.
This condition may be restated as f(z; x) = x+ E (x  z) where E (:) is strictly
increasing and concave and meets the requirement: E (0) = 0. Finally, the
functional is that of a disappointment model where elation/disappointment is
an increasing and convex function of the excess of the actual outcome over its
expected value. It is a particular case of the model developed by L&S (1986).
It may also be viewed as the opposite to a convex measure of risk (in the sense
of Föllmer and Schied (2002)), since one may set:
r( ~w)
def
=  c ( ew) =  (E[ ~w] + R b
a
E(x  E[ ~w])dF ~w(x)) =  U( ew) (8).
The interest of the above result is that it allows for grounding a convex measure
of risk on a theory of the behaviour of economic agents towards risk. The risk
controller is then assumed to behave according to Axioms 1 to 4, to exhibit
constant marginal utility and to have preferences endowed with the translation
invariance property.
Moreover, from Equation (8) we also get a decomposition of the risk pre-
mium ( ~w)
def
= E[ ~w]   c ( ew) into elementary premia, which can be viewed as
the contributions of the variance, the skewness, the kurtosis ... of a random
prospect to the total risk premium which is demanded by an investor. If E(:) is
smooth enough, one may write:
 ( ew) =  P+1n=2 E [( ew   E [ ew])n] E(n) (E [ ew]) =n! (9).
The total risk premium is then an innite sum of elementary premia, each
of which is proportional to the product of two terms: the nth order centered
moment of the random variable ew, i.e. E [( ew   E [ ew])n], and the nth order
derivative of E (:) taken at point z = E [ ew]. Any even moment is but a quantity
of a "symmetric" risk and its coe¢ cient must be negative if the investor is
risk averse, whatever the considered denition of risk. An odd moment may
be viewed as a quantity of an "asymmetric" risk and its coe¢ cient must be
positive if the investor is risk averse. Finally, Equation (9) may be viewed
as a theoretical grounding of the multimoment approach of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model. Now recall that EU theory is often violated by experiments and
that no general agreement has yet been found about the explaining power of
its challengers, i.e. Non-EU theories. Hence it is interesting to point out that,
because of its exibility, the functional (9) is compatible with many of the
anomalies of nancial theory.
3.3.2 Variable marginal utility
We now turn to the general case of variable marginal utility. The func-
tional U( ew) will now read: U( ew) = u (c ( ew)) = R b
a
f(E[u ( ~w)]; x)dF ~w(x). Here
again f (z; x) is strictly increasing and concave with respect to x and meets
the following condition: f (0; 0) = 0. Since investors care but about "utils",
the risk premium of an arbitrary prospect ew 2 W is now dened as ( ~w) def=
E[u ( ~w)] u (c ( ew)) and one may again assume that risk premia are translation-
invariant when they are expressed in utils, i.e. : u (c ( ew) + y) = u (c ( ew))+u (y).
10
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Under reasonable mathematical assumptions, the functional may be identi-
ed to a LS-functional which expresses as: U ( ew) def= R b
a
E[u( ~w)](x)dF ew (x) =
E[u ( ~w)]+
R b
a
E (u (x)  E[u ( ~w)]))dF ew (x). Elation/disappointment is an increas-
ing and convex function of the excess of the actual outcome over its expected
utility. Clearly, the above results are of interest i¤ u (:) can be elicited. This
question is now going to be addressed.
3.3.3 The elicitation property.
We focus, in this subsection on LS-functionals, because, as it has been proved
in Chauveau and Nalpas (2010), they are endowed with the elicitation property.
As a preliminary, we set a new denition:
Denition 6 (strong indi¤erence). Two prospects ew1 and ew2 are strongly
indi¤erent i¤ (a) they are indi¤erent and (b) they meet the betweenness prop-
erty.3 The binary relation " ew1 and ew2 are strongly indi¤erent" will be labelled
" ew1  ew2".
The binary relation  is obviously an equivalence relation over W. Clearly,
strong indi¤erence implies indi¤erence in the usual sense which will be called,
from now on, weak indi¤erence. The properties of LS-functionals may then be
summed up in the following propositions where ewa;xp ( ewy;b1 q) denotes the binary
lottery [a; x; 1  p; p] ([y; b; q; 1  q]).
Proposition 7 (strong indi¤erence). If preferences are represented by a
LS-functional, two prospects ew1 and ew2 are strongly indi¤erent i¤ they exhibit
the same certainty equivalent and the same expected utility, what formally
reads: ew1  ew2 , c ( ew1) = c ( ew2) and E [u ( ew1)] = E [u ( ew2)]
Proposition 8 (strong equivalents). If preferences are represented by a
LS-functional, there exists exactly one binary lottery of the ewa;xp type (of theewy;b1 q type) which is strongly indi¤erent to ew. Lottery ewa;xp ( ewy;b1 q) will be called
the left (right) strong equivalent of ew. The degenerate lottery  (z) (the binary
lottery ewa;bu(z)) is a maximal (minimal) element in Wu(z), i.e. ewa;bu(z)  z   (z).
Proofs. The proofs are given in the Appendix.
An important property of LS-models is the elicitation property. Let w 2 [a; b]
( 2 [0; 1]) be an arbitrary level of wealth (probability). Consider the sequence
of binary lotteries labelled f ewa;xnpn gn2N that meets the below requirements:
x0 = w; p0 =  and ewxn+1;b1 pn+1  ewa;xnpn
where ewxn+1;b1 pn+1 is the right strong equivalent of ewa;xnpn . Clearly, fxngn2N is
a strictly decreasing sequence. The di¤erence between the expected utilities
of two consecutive binary lotteries, ewa;xnpn and ewa;xn+1pn+1 , is equal to the second
weight (1 pn+1) of the right strong equivalent ewxn+1;b1 pn+1 of ewa;xnpn , what formally
reads:
E

u( ewa;xnpn )  E u( ewa;xn+1pn+1 ) = 1  pn+1.
3Recall that two prospects share the betweenness property i¤ for any  2 [0; 1] ; ew1  ew2
) ew1   ew1  (1  ) ew2  ew2.
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Consequently, the expected utility of the initial lottery i.e. u (w)satises
the following equality:
u (w) = E

u( ewa;xnpn )+Pni=1(1  pi) (10).
Alternatively, one may consider a sequence of binary lotteries, f ewyn;bqn gn2N,
that are dened as indicated below:
y0 = w; q0 =  and ewa;yn+1qn+1  ewyn;b1 qn
and the elements of the sequence are endowed with the following property:
E

u( ewa;yn+1qn+1 )  E u( ewa;ynqn ) = 1  qn+1, or, equivalently,
u (w) = E

u( ewa;ynqn ) Pni=1 (1  qi) (11).
From now on, the sequences f ewa;xnpn gn2N and f ewyn;b1 qngn2N, will be called the
canonical sequences generated by (w; ). As shown below, they respectively
converge, in LS-models, towards  (a) or  (b). The result holds whatever the
value of .
Proposition 9 (elicitation property). Let f ewa;xnpn gn2N and f ewyn;bqn gn2N be
the canonical sequences of binary lotteries generated by (w; ) 2 ]a; b[]0; 1[. As-
sume that preferences are represented by a LS-functional and that investors are
disappointment averse. Then, fxngn2N (fyngn2N) is a decreasing (increasing)
sequence of real numbers converging towards a (b). The sequence f1  pngn2N
(f1  qngn2N) is increasing and converges towards ` (1 `) where ` does not
depend on  and is a strictly increasing function of w, mapping [a; b] on to
[0; 1].
Proof. It is given in the Appendix.
Finally, in LS-models, we have the following equalities:
l = lim
n!1(
Pn
i=1 (1  pi))= = limn!1(1 
Pn
i=0 (1  qi))=
and from now on we shall set l = u (w). Finally, note that Axioms 1 to 4
are, at least in principle, experimentally testable since their checking comes
down to making choices between binary loteries. The number of experiments
obviously depends on the desired accuracy of the elementary utility function
u(:). The last remark is that EU theory is clearly a degenerate case of the
above disappointment theory.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, a fully choice-based theory of disappointment has been developed
which can be viewed as an axiomatic foundation of models à la L&S (1986).
The above theory of disappointment may be generalized in three ways: the rst
consists in relaxing the assumption of a concave or convex n.e.u. function. One
can also weaken the assumption of functions which are continuously derivable
and allow for discontinuities on a nite set of values of their argument. Last, the
assumption made at the beginning of Section 3, according to which no violations
of SSD occur, is convenient but not essential.
12
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.63 (Version révisée)
References
[1] Becker, J.L., R. Sarin. 1987. Lottery Dependent Utility.Management Science
33 1367-1382.
[2] Chauveau Th. and N. Nalpas 2010. Disappointment models: an axiomatic
approach, CES working paper 2010.102.
[3] Föllmer H. and A. Schied 2002. Convex measures of risk and trading con-
straints. Finance Stoch. 6, 429-447.
[4] Fishburn, P.C. 1970. Utility Theory for Decision Making. Wiley, New-York.
[5] Loomes, G., R. Sugden. 1986. Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in
Choice under Uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies 53 271-282.
[6] Rothschild M. and J. E. Stiglitz 1970. Increasing Risk; I A Denition, Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 2 225-243.
5 Appendix (Proofs)
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let e!i = u ( ewi) for i = 1; 2. By denition of SSSD, it is equivalent to state
(a) ew2 -u2 ew1,
(b) e!2 -2 e!1 , or
(c)
R v
0
[Fe!1 (t)  Fe!2 (t)] dt  0 for v 2 [0; 1],. This last condition is, in its
turn equivalent to the following one:R z
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x) F ew2 (x))dx  0 for any z 2 [a; b], because of the following
equality:R v
0
[Fe!1 (t)  Fe!2 (t)] dt = R u 1(v)a (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))u0 (x) dx. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
We want to prove that if ew1 dominates ew2 by SSSD, then ew1 is preferred toew2 or, equivalently, that U ( ew1) U ( ew2)  0. To do so, consider two prospectsew1 and ew2. LetZ b
a
u0 (t)F ewi (t) dt =  
Z b
a
u (x) dF ewi =  E [ ewi] =  i
for i = 1; 2. Assume that ew1 dominates ew2 by SSSD, we get:Z b
a
u0 (t) (F ew1 (t)  F ew2 (t))dt =   (1   2)  0) 1   2  0
Next, since E (:) is strictly increasing we also get:
E (u (x)  1)  E (u (x)  2)
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and the di¤erence between the two functionals expresses as:
U ( ew1) U ( ew2) = Z b
a
(u (x) + E (u (x)  1))dF ew1 (x)
 
Z b
a
(u (x) + E (u (x)  2))dF ew2 (x)
= (1   2)
+
Z b
a
E (u (x)  1) dF ew1 (x) 
Z b
a
E (u (x)  2) dF ew2 (x)
and, nally:
U ( ew1) U ( ew2) = T1 + T2
where:
T1 = (1   2) +
Z b
a
(E (u (x)  1)  E (u (x)  2)) dF ew2 (x)
and:
T2 =
Z b
a
E (u (x)  1) (dF ew1 (x)  dF ew2 (x))
Straightworward calculations give:
T1 = (1   2) 
Z b
a
(1   2) E 0 (u (x)  1 + 1 (1   2)) dF ew2 (x)
with 1 2 [0; 1] and:
T2 = [E (u (x)  1) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))]ba
 
Z b
a
E 0 (u (x)  1)u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx
= E ( 1) (F ew1 (a)  F ew2 (a)) 
Z b
a
E 0 (u (x)  1)u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx
= E ( 1) (F ew1 (a)  F ew2 (a))  E 0 (1  1)
Z b
a
u0 (t) (F ew1 (t)  F ew2 (t)) dt
+
Z b
a
E 00 (u (x)  1)u0 (x)
Z x
a
u0 (t) (F ew1 (t)  F ew2 (t))dt

dx
Clearly, the following inequality: [1  sup E 0(z)]  0 implies the following
equality: sign (T1) = sign (1   2). Hence, T1 is positive since 1   2  0.
The term T2 is also positive, since it is the sum of three positive terms:
(a) E ( 1) (F ew1 (a)   F ew2 (a)) is positive because E ( 1) is negative and
so is (F ew1 (a)  F ew2 (a)) (from SSSD)
(b) the second term is positive because E 0 (1  1) is positive, and the integralR b
a
u0 (t) (F ew1 (t)  F ew2 (t)) dt is negative (from SSSD).
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(c) the last term is positive because E 00 (u (x)  1) is negative, u0 (x) is
positive and
R x
a
u0 (t) (F ew1 (t)  F ew2 (t)) dt is negative (from SSSD). Finally,
U ( ew1) U ( ew2)  0 
Proof of Proposition 3.
As a preliminary, recall that u (:) is more concave than v (:) if and only if
u  v 1 (:) is concave i.e. if there exists g (:) mapping [0; 1] on to itself and such
that: u (x) = g  v (x) with g0 (:) > 0 and g00 (:) < 0
The proof is grounded on the following calculations:
Z z
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dt =
Z z
a
g0 (v (x)) v0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx
=

g0 (v (x))
Z x
a
v0 (t) (F ew1 (t)  F ew2 (t))dt
z
a
 
Z z
a
g00 (v (x)) v0 (x)
Z x
a
v0 (t) (F ew1 (t)  F ew2 (t))dt

dx
= g0 (v (z))
Z z
a
v0 (t) (F ew1 (t)  F ew2 (t))dt
 
Z z
a
g00 (v (x)) v0 (x)
Z x
a
v0 (t) (F ew1 (t)  F ew2 (t))dt

dx
Finally, we get the following equivalences and/or implications:Z z
a
v0 (t) (F ew1 (t) F ew2 (t))dt < 0 for any z )
Z z
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x) Few2 (x))dx < 0 for any z
or: ew
1
-v2 ew2 ) ew1 -u2 ew2 , Wv2 Wu2
and, as a consequence:
Wv 2 Wu 2 andWv+2 Wu+2

Proof of Proposition 4.
Two cases may occur: either SSD is violated or not.
A. We rst assume that SSD is not violated. As a consequence, there
exists at least one concave function which is consistent. It is the n.e.u. a¢ ne
function dened by f (x) = (x  a) = (b  a). Hence, UC 6= ?.
The subset UC may then include one element or more. In the rst case
UC = ff (:)g and Proposition 4 is clearly valid. We now leave aside this trivial
case and assume that UC includes at least two elements, i.e. at least one strictly
concave n.e.u. function.
Consider two n.e.u. functions, u (:) and v (:). Then, from Proposition 3, we
get the following results:
15
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(a) if u (:) is consistent and is more concave than v (:), then v (:) is also
consistent.
(b) if u (:) and v (:) are concave and consistent, thenMin (u; v) is consistent.
(c) Similarly, If v (:) is inconsistent and less concave than u (:) then u (:) is
also inconsistent.
(d) if u (:) and v (:) are concave and if Min (u; v) is inconsistent, then u (:)
and v (:) are inconsistent.
(e) if u (:) is more concave than v (:) then v (:) 2 hypo (u), where hypo (u) is
the hypograph of u.
Let u (:) denote the lower envelope of the functions belonging to UC. We
want to prove thatWu 2 = ?. The proof is three-step.
The rst step consists in dening a consistent concave n.e.u. function u (:)
which is close to u (:). First, recall that the hypograph of u (:) is dened as
hypo (u) =
T
u2UC hypo(u) and, consequently, any concave n.e.u. function whose
hypograph is strictly included in hypo (u)4 is consistent.
Now let u (:) be dened by the following equality:
u (x)
def
= u (x)  y (x)
where
y (x) = 

x  a
b  a

  

x  a
b  a
2
Clearly, y (x)  0 for x 2 [a; b], y0 (x)  0 for x 2 [a; a+ (b  a) =2], y0 (x)  0
for x 2 [a+ (b  a) =2; ] b, y (a) = y (b) = 0, a+(b  a) =2 = Argmax [y (x)] and
max [y (x)] = =4. A su¢ cient condition for u (:) to be concave is that:
 <
1
2
(b  a)2 inf
x2[a;b]
( u00 (x))
Moreover, u (:) will be strictly increasing if u0 (x) is strictly positive. A su¢ cient
condition for this is that:
 < (b  a) inf
x2[a;b]
(u0 (x))
and, nally, u (:) is concave and strictly increasing if the real number  satises
the below inequality:
 < min

1
2
(b  a)2 inf
x2[a;b]
( u00 (x)) ; (b  a) inf
x2[a;b]
(u0 (x))

(1)
Since u (a) = u (a) = 0 and u (b) = u (b) = 1, u (:) is normalized and since
 > 0, the hypograph of u (:) strictly includes that of u (:) and u (:) is consistent.
Finally, the function u (:) is a concave n.e.u. function if (1) is met.
4 i.e. there exists at least one value of x 2 [a; b] such that u (x) < u (x).
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The second step consists in looking for an upper bound for the following
di¤erence:
 =
R z
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx  R za u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx
Integrating by parts, we get:
 =
R z
a
(u0 (x)  u0 (x))(F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx
=
(u (z)  u (z)) (F ew1 (z)  F ew2 (z)) + R za (u0 (x)  u0 (x)) (dF ew1 (x)  dF ew2 (x))
and, consequently:
  j(u (z)  u (z)) (F ew1 (z)  F ew2 (z))j+R za (u0 (x)  u0 (x)) (dF ew1 (x)  dF ew2 (x))
(2)
The rst term is bounded indicated as below:
j(u (z)  u (z)) (F ew1 (z)  F ew2 (z))j  j(u (z)  u (z))j  sup
z2[a;b]
ju0 (z)  u0 (z)j
We now show that he second term may be bounded as indicated belowR z
a
(u0 (x)  u0 (x)) (dF ew1 (x)  dF ew2 (x))  2 sup
z2[a;b]
ju0 (z)  u0 (z)j
Indeed, we haveR z
a
(u0 (x)  u0 (x)) (dF ew1 (x)  dF ew2 (x))  R za (u0 (x)  u0 (x)) dF ew1 (x)+ R z
a
(u0 (x)  u0 (x)) dF ew2 (x)
and, for i = 1; 2::R z
a
(u0 (x)  u0 (x)) dF ewi (x)  sup
z2[a;b]
ju0 (z)  u0 (z)j R z
a
dF ewi (x)  sup
z2[a;b]
ju0 (z)  u0 (z)j
Finally, an upper bound of  is given by the following inequality:
  3 sup
z2[a;b]
ju0 (z)  u0 (z)j
Now, recall that sup
z2[a;b]
ju0 (z)  u0 (z)j = sup
z2[a;b]
  z ab a    z ab a2 = =4.
As a consequence, we get
  3=4
The last step consists in showing that if u (:) were not consistent, then we
would get a contradiction. Indeed if u (:) were not consistent there would exist
two prospects ew1 and ew2 such that ew1  ew2 and, simultaneously, there would
exist z 2 [a; b], such that R z
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)   F ew2 (x))dx > 0. In other words,
there would exist a strictly positive real number  such thatR z
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx   > 0
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Actually, since u (:) is consistent, we must have
R z
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x) Few2 (x))dx <
0 and, consequently: we get:
 =
R z
a
u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx+ R za u0 (x) (F ew1 (x)  F ew2 (x))dx  
and, nally:
  3=4
Hence, if  is small enough, i.e. if  < 4=3, we get a contradiction and,
nally, u (:) is well consistent.
B. We now assume that SSD is not violated, that is when Wf 2 6= ?.
Then, no concave n.e.u. functions may be consistent. Indeed, if u were a
consistent and concave n. e:u function, then, from Proposition 3, f (:) would
be consistent, which would contradict the initial assumption. By contrast, the
subset of convex n.e.u. functions is never empty since it always includes the
following function: u (x) = 0 for x 2 [a; b[ and u (b) = 1. The rest of the proof
is analogous to the above one.
Proof of Proposition 7.
The rst part of the proof consists in proving that, in LS-models, two in-
di¤erent prospects ew1 and ew2 which have the same expected utility u and the
same certainty equivalent c, are strongly indi¤erent. Let ew1 and ew2 exhibit the
same expected utility u and the same certainty equivalent c. From (2) we get,
for i = 1; 2:
u (c) = u+
PN
n=1 p
i
n (E (u (wn)  u))
where ewi = w1; :::; wN ; pi1; :::; piN (i = 1; 2) and where u = PNn=1 pinu (wn).
As a consequence, we have:PN
n=1 p
1
nE (u (wn)  u) 
PN
n=1 p
2
nE (u (wn)  u) = 0 (3)
Now, consider the compound lottery
ew def=  ew1(1  ) ew2 = w1; :::; wN ; p11 + (1  ) p21; :::; p1N + (1  ) p2N
Its expected utility is:
E [u ( ew)] =PNn=1(p1n + (1  ) p2n)u (wn) = u
From (??) we get:
u (c ( ew)) = u+PNn=1  p1n + (1  ) p2n E (u (wn)  u)
where c ( ew) is the certainty equivalent of ew and, nally:
u (c ( ew))  u (c) = PNn=1 p1nE (u (wn)  u) PNn=1 p2nE (u (wn)  u) = 0
18
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The proof of the converse is as follows. Consider two discrete prospects:ewi = w1; :::; wN ; pi1; :::; piN i = 1; 2
and their probability mixture:
 ew1  (1  ) ew2 = w1; :::; wN ; p11 + (1  ) p21; :::; p1N + (1  ) p2N
where  2 [0; 1]. We must show that if ew1 and ew2 are strongly indi¤erent i.e.
if they have the same certainty equivalent and if they exhibit the betweenness
property, then they exhibit the same expected utility. We have, for i = 1; 2:
u (c) = u (c ( ewi)) = ui +PNn=1 pinE  uin
where:
ui =
PN
n=1 p
i
nu (wn) and u
i
n = u (wn)  ui (4)
By denition, we have:
u (c ( ew1  (1  ) ew2)) = u1+(1  )u2+PNn=1 p1n + (1  ) p2n E  u1n + (1  )u2n
Now, from (??), we get:
u (c ( ew1))+(1  )u (c ( ew2)) = u1+(1  )u2+PNn=1 p1nE  u1n+PNn=1 (1  ) p2nE  u2n
Substracting the above equation from the previous one and using the between-
ness property yields:PN
n=1 p
1
nE
 
u1n

+
PN
n=1 p
2
n (1  ) E
 
u2n

= 
PN
n=1 p
1
nE
 
u1n + (1  )u2n

+(1  )
PN
n=1 p
2
nE
 
u1n + (1  )u2n

or, equivalently:PN
n=1 p
1
nE
 
u1n

+
PN
n=1 p
2
n (1  ) E
 
u1n

+
PN
n=1 p
2
n (1  )
 E  u2n  E  u1n
=
PN
n=1

p1n + (1  ) p2n
 E  u1n + (1  )u2n
and, nally:PN
n=1

p1n + (1  ) p2n
  E  u1n 
E  u1n + (1  )u2n

=
PN
n=1 p
2
n (1  )
 E  u1n  E  u2nPN
n=1

p1n + (1  ) p2n
  E (u (wn)  u1)
 E (u (wn)  u)

(1  ) 1 = PNn=1 p2n E (u (wn)  u1) E (u (wn)  u2)

PN
n=1$n ()
 
u1n   u2n
 E 0 u (wn)  u1
+n ()
 
u1n   u2n
  =PNn=1 p2n  u1n   u2n
 E 0

u (wn)  u1
+n
 
u1n   u2n
 
(u1   u2)
PN
n=1$n () E 0

u (wn)  u1
+n () (u1   u2)

= (u1   u2)

PN
n=1 p
2
nE 0

u (wn)  u1
+n (u1   u2)

(u1   u2)F () = (u1   u2) 
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Since F () cannot be equal to  for any value of , we must have u1 u2 =
0:
Proof of Proposition 8.
Let: ewa;b def= [a; b; 1  ; ] ; ewz; def=  (z) (1  ) ewa;b
and:
u
def
= u (z) + (1  ) = E [u( ew )]
In LS-models we get:
U( ewz;) def= u+ E(u (z)  u)+ (1  )E(1  u) + (1  ) (1  )E(  u)
and, consequently:
U( ewz;) = U( (z)) + (1  )U( ewa;b ) + EXP
where:
EXP
def
= E(u (z)  u) + (1  )

 (E(1  u)  E(1  ))
+(1  )(E( u)  E( ))

We get:
EXP = (u (z)  u)E 0( (u (z)  u)) + (1  )(   u)E 0(1   + (   u))
+ (1  ) (1  )(   u)E 0(  + (   u))
or:
EXP =  (1  ) (u (z)  )E 0( (1  ) (u (z)  ))
+ (1  )(   u (z))

E 0(1   + (   u (z)))
+(1  )E 0(  + (   u (z)))

and, nally:
EXP =  (1  ) (u (z)  )
24 E 0( (1  ) (u (z)  ))  E 0(1   + (   u (z)))
+(1  )E 0(  + (   u (z)))
 35
The above condition can be rewritten as:
EXP =  (1  ) (u (z)  ) fE 0( (1  ) (u (z)  ))  expg
where:
exp = E 0(1   + (   u (z))) + (1  )E 0(  + (   u (z)))
= E 0(0) + (   u (z))E 00(s(   u (z)) + (1  )E 0(0)
+ (1  )(   u (z))E 00(k(   u (z))
20
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Note that we have:
E 0( (1  ) (u (z)  ))  exp = E 0(0)  fE 0(0) + (1  )E 0(0)g
+  (1  ) (u (z)  ) E 00(t (1  ) (u (z)  ))
  (   u (z))E 00(s(   u (z)))
  (1  )(   u (z))E 00(k(   u (z))
and, nally:
EXP =  (1  ) (u (z)  )2
8<:  (1  ) E
00(t (1  ) (u (z)  ))
+E 00(s(   u (z)))
+(1  )E 00(k(   u (z))
9=; < 0
'  (1  ) (u (z)  )2E 00(0) f (1  ) + g
and the condition EXP = 0 implies u (z)   = 0.
Proof of Proposition 9.
If xn+1 were greater than xn, ewxn+1;b1 pn+1 would exhibit rst-order stochastic
dominance over ewa;xnpn . Hence, xn+1 is lower than xn and fxngn2N is a decreasing
sequence. It is also bounded below by a. Consequently, it converges towards
a limit `  a. Next, note that the two strongly indi¤erent lotteries ewa;xnpn andewxn+1;b1 pn+1have the same expected utility, i.e., we have:
pnu (xn) = pn+1u (xn+1) + (1  pn+1) for n = 0; 1; ::: (5)
and summing the members of the above equalities yields:
u (w) = pnu (xn) +
Pn
i=1 (1  pi) for n = 1; 2; :::
The above equality implies Sn
def
=
Pn
i=1 (1  pi)  u (w). SincefSngn2N
is an increasing sequence, it converges towards a limit   u (w). As a con-
sequence, Sn   Sn 1 = (1  pn:) ! 0, i.e. pn: ! 1. Moreover, since we have:ewa;xn+1pn+1  ewxn+1;b1 pn+1  ewa;xnpn , the sequence of binary lotteries  ewa;xnpn 	n2N is de-
creasing and converges towards ewa;l1 =  (l). Similarly, f ewxn;b1 pngn2N converges
towards ewl;b0 =  (l).
We now show that ` = a. To see this, assume ` > a. Then, since ewa;xnpn 
 (l), there exists a binary lottery ewa;xnpn such that l < xn < xn, and ewa;xnpn   (l).
Let xn+1 and p

n+1 be dened by ewxn+1;b1 pn+1  ewa;xnpn . Since f ewxn;b1 pngn2N converges
towards  (l), there exists an integer N , such that m  N ) l  xm < xn+1 and
pm  pn+1. This implies that ewxn+1;b1 pn+1 should be preferred to the ewxm;b1 pms and,
consequently, that  (l) should be preferred to the ewxm;b1 pms, that contradicts the
fact that f ewxn;b1 pngn2N is decreasing and converges towards  (l). Hence ` = a
and fSngn2N converges towards  = u (w). As a consequence, equality (14)
is checked.
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